Anyone observing the armed conflict in Sudan between the army, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and their allies must, in the interest of objectivity, exclude the category of volunteers or those who conscientiously reject violence but are forced to participate due to the nature of the conflict and the involuntary circumstances that compel them to take up arms in defense of their lives and families. This is a consequence of residential areas being transformed into battlefields, where civilians are subjected to violations in the absence of protection.
The Nature of the War: We can classify this war within the pattern of conflicts involving political Islam and its offshoots operating outside the constitutional framework, commonly referred to as proxies, auxiliaries, or militias. Recognition of these forces came within this context, and a law was enacted for them in 2017 to formalize their status and regulate their activities.[1] This facilitated their deployment in foreign engagements, including the war in Yemen. However, this necessitated their inclusion in the Constitutional Charter of 2019, pending a more comprehensive approach to security and military reform.[2]
This reform was intended to address the systematic political restructuring of national institutions and the ideological influence exerted over military doctrine under the policies of political Islam, which shifted loyalty from the state to the organization. These wars rely on planned violations of both international humanitarian law and human rights through the use of human shields and collective punishment of civilians. Furthermore, they leave the door open to alliances with virtually any actor. Consequently, they often encompass groups regardless of their legal record, moral standing, or political orientation.
The April 2023 war carries an important dimension in that the Rapid Support Forces represent an extension of the auxiliary forces or militias. Their military culture derives from the model created by the army, which, owing to Sudan's repeated internal conflicts, increasingly evolved into a force used to confront political and social demands in accordance with the interests of ruling authorities. The reference here is to military culture rather than military doctrine. Military doctrine within the army itself was transformed by ideological influences associated with political Islam, as acknowledged by Hassan al-Turabi in public remarks delivered in Qatar.[3]
In contrast, ideological doctrine remained largely absent from the auxiliary forces because of the nature of their formation and the limited tasks originally assigned to them, including scorched-earth operations directed against specific communities. Their motivations often centered less on grievance and more on anticipated gains.
A notable distinction emerged with the RSF. Its evolution from the Border Guards was linked to political calculations within the ruling establishment and conflicts inside the Sudanese Islamic Movement and the National Congress Party. External factors, including the global financial crisis of 2013, Sudan's participation in the Yemen war from 2015, and cooperation under the Khartoum Process concerning migration, enhanced the RSF's international standing and fueled ambitions for political power.[4]